God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism (2000) is a critique of the open theism movement, which says that future moral decisions of free agents are undetermined and therefore unknowable even to God. Bruce A. Ware is a respected Calvinist theologian and has been Professor of Christian Theology at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary since 1998. He was also president of the Evangelical Theological Society.
God’s Lesser Glory is not the first book-length rebuttal of 1990s open theism, as Norman Geisler had preceded him with Creating God in the Image of Man (1997). Ware’s book, however, is considered a go-to resource among many Calvinists that I have met.
Ware begins his preface with a call to Christian charity, and even mentions how he knew Greg Boyd, one of the key open theist authors, in seminary. He then disagrees with Boyd that the issue at hand is not of secondary importance. Ware leaves it unclear here whether they should even be considered evangelicals, but in a 2002 article, he argued that open theists should be excluded from the Evangelical Theological Society.
Open Theology Caricatured: It Is Moral Decisions That Must Be Free
Ware mis-portrays open theism at a number of points in the book, especially with regard to which future choices God does not know. The introduction to the book immediately portrays a caricature of open theism by making an analogy to our own ignorance of the future—traffic jams, unforeseen accidents (p.17), whether we will exercise (p.125), etc. Trivial and amoral examples will follow throughout as we repeatedly discuss whether or not “Carl” is going to order shrimp salad at the Oyster Bar (p.36, 40). Such examples show that Ware has missed the point of open theism. Gordon Olson taught almost 50 years ago that it is moral choices that must be free, because it is moral choices that God holds us responsible for. God may freely and providentially arrange man’s non-moral or amoral choices (Acts 17:26), because we are not eternally held responsible for them. Even in decisions with bearing on morality, God may even arrange which option we choose without encroaching on our moral responsibility, as in the story of Pharaoh in Exodus. Ware points out more than once that Boyd and Sanders both view the future as partially undetermined and partially determined, but Ware shows no awareness of the ethical motivation behind this distinction:
1) God is providentially in control of human history, so that much of the future is determined beforehand;
2) because it is unjust to be held responsible for choices that were determined beforehand by others, future moral choices must remain free, and therefore undetermined, uncertain, and unknowable.
This also clears up many of the Bible verses which are purported by Ware to contradict open theism (p.81). In fact, it undermines entire portions of Ware’s book in which he sees open theism as inadequate for explaining biblical prophecy (p.130–140). Arguably, all or nearly all of the predictions Ware lists are amoral events, and it in no way endangers open theism for them to be predicted by God. For instance, we could say that Jesus knew from Peter’s heart that Peter would temporarily deny him under pressure, but God providentially arranged the circumstances of that denial so that it would occur thrice before the cock’s crow. Another counter-example offered by Ware is God’s foreknowledge of the length of Hezekiah’s life, which Ware sees as an inextricable difficulty to the open theist (p.95–96). He is adamant that the length of Hezekiah’s life depends on “future free choices”. But surely God can control the circumstances or timing of one person’s death without infringing on their future moral decisions, even in open theism. The same rebuttal applies to people “moving” and “building houses” in the predictions of Isaiah 44. All this shows that Ware has misunderstood the fundamental presuppositions of open theism, which involve denying God’s foreknowledge of moral choices (such as following Jesus Christ), not all free choices (such as buying shrimp salad for dinner).
Ware harps on about how the open theist God could never with certainty fulfill any of the many Scriptural prophecies, because he would have to providentially manipulate circumstances in people’s lives (i.e., “future free choices”). He goes so far as to doubt that an open theist God could guarantee the second coming of Jesus Christ! He repeatedly misconstrues libertarian freedom as an outright rejection of God’s providence, and open theism as God’s total ignorance of future events. Perhaps in this he is following the language of Boyd and Sanders; but Pratney, for instance, preaches emphatically that “God is active in human history”. Even Boyd and Sanders, who wrote rebuttals to this book, stated that Ware had misconstrued their doctrine as an outsider who was unable to follow the outworking of their philosophy.
Open Theism Caricatured: God Is Supreme over History (Even in Open Theism)
Throughout the book, Ware states baldly that God doesn’t know the future in open theism and that God “learns” as the future unfolds. After questioning the reliability of a God who (as he puts it) doesn’t know the future, Ware writes, “Many readers may be surprised to learn that this very view (namely, that God does not know much of the future and has to learn what happens as that future unfolds) is being advocated by a growing number of biblical scholars, theologians, and philosophers who identify themselves as evangelicals, some of whom teach at highly respected evangelical colleges and seminaries” (p. 18). Again, ” … generally God [in open theism] does not know what will happen in the future” (p. 19). And later, “God [in open theism] plans and works without the advantage of knowing the future” (p.144)! In certain places, open theism is more correctly stated as involving “future free human choices” (p. 18, footnote), but it is largely characterised throughout as a simple denial of foreknowledge (rather than a denial of simple foreknowledge, in favor of dynamic foreknowledge). This is further clarified in a footnote on page 34, after many pages of generalisations.
The caricature worsens as he accuses open theism of questioning God’s ability to enact any overarching plan in history: “Will God succeed in fulfilling his goals? Will history move in the direction he hopes it will? Are God’s predictions and promises sure? The only answer open theists can give to these questions is that they are hopeful that God will somehow pull it off” (p.20). (Long series of rhetorical questions are an overly frequent device in the book, p.50,68,76,77,86,95,163,177.) Again, “not even God knows whether his purposes will be fulfilled” (p.51). This is absolutely an incorrect depiction of open theism, and severely weakens Ware’s argument. At these points, he is arguing against process theism, not open theism; at other points, he levels thinly veiled criticisms at Arminianism, too.
Again, on page 98, “We [the royal we] have endeavored to demonstrate that neither the divine growth-in-knowledge texts nor the repentance texts imply that God has learned something he did not previously know.” But that is not the position of open theism either! What Ware is describing here, by using the term “learn” of God, is process theism, in which God grows and learns in response to creation. He further speaks of the open theist God as being “mistaken”. In a response to Ware, Boyd agrees with me: Ware is simply not representing the open theist position correctly. In open theism, God only “learns” in the technical sense that he “experiences” our choices as they happen, which is a fact admitted by Ware, though couched differently. Additionally, saying that God “learns something he did not previously know” implies that it was there to know, yet again missing the open theist’s philosophical presupposition that future moral choices have not been determined yet.
Limited Literature Engagement
Unsurprisingly, Ware misses the fact that open theism has been around about as long as Arminianism, although obviously as a minority position. This is a fact that is largely unknown to most critics of open theism. Ware calls it a “revisionist model of God” (p.21), tracing it, as many others have done, to the 1994 book The Openness of God, with a footnoted nod to Richard Rice’s 1980 book by the same title. Rather, Rice, Boyd, Pinnock, Sanders, and others, are only the latest instantiation of a revision of Arminianism that has been around for centuries. Arminius’ own successor at Leiden University, Conrad Vorstius, questioned God’s exhaustive foreknowledge in passing in the early 1600s; in the intellectual climate of the time, this would not be borne. But Samuel Fancourt wrote extensive and detailed arguments in favor of the open view, from both Scripture and reason, from 1725 to 1735, as did James Jones in the 1820s, L. D. McCabe in the 1870s, Gordon Olson in the early twentieth century, and Roy Elseth in 1977. None of these were known to Ware, which is excusable because they have received almost no scholarly engagement. Perhaps temporal hubris is to blame.
Less excusable is Ware’s oversight of newer scholarly material such as the many works of Terence Fretheim. Fretheim’s 1984 book The Suffering of God is considered by many to be the seminal perspective toward open theology, though Fretheim does not dogmatically claim to be an open theist. Many open theist ministers that I know were strongly influenced by Terence Fretheim and W. A. Pratney, but have never heard of Greg Boyd or John Sanders. Much Wesleyan literature on prayer also includes material in favor of open theism (Bounds, Harney, Brother Andrew).
In dealing with the biblical material, Ware engages with barely any relevant commentaries, and makes no attempt at any history of interpretation. I suppose this is because of the book’s popular audience, but it would have strengthened his argument to include at least a few references from biblical studies.
Biblical Evidence & More Begging the Question (p.65–86)
Ware’s handling of the biblical text is the high point of the book, and includes very little that is objectionable. In general, I believe that his strong criticism of open theism in these verses stems from his misunderstanding of open theism more than his misunderstanding of the Scripture.
Throughout, he strongly criticises the assertion that open theism takes the “biblical high ground” by its plain reading of divine repentance texts. This problem is first mentioned on page 25, and then returns on page 65. He states that open theists are reading these Old Testament texts wrongly, and that they are anthropomorphism, but Ware offers no diagnostic with which to test his assertion, until page 86: “A given ascription to God may rightly be understood as anthropomorphic when Scripture clearly presents God as transcending the very human or finite features it elsewhere attributes to him.” Ware should have stated this hermeneutic up front, since this is the fulcrum on which the whole chapter pivots.
The biblical discussion is frequently framed around the Old Testament: Abraham’s offering of Isaac, Moses’ prayer, the rejection of Saul, the repentance of Nineveh. It would take too much time to go over every Scripture in detail, but below I’ll address some of Ware’s interpretations.
Genesis 22:12: “Now I know” (p. 67–74)
And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me.
Genesis 22:12, KJV
Here God states that Abraham has passed the test by offering up Isaac, and “now he knows” that Abraham fears God. Ware points out that many verses show that Abraham already feared God. The New Testament cross-references here have some important bearing. Since God (both in open theism and classical theism) knows Abraham’s innermost thoughts, God could not have “learned” that Abraham feared him through Abraham’s act of obedience. But here, Ware is only begging the question. If Abraham had true moral freedom of choice, then his act of obedience mattered to God, and not merely as an external display of internal thoughts. Yes, Abraham was already faithful, but what God required of him in this passage was an extraordinary level of obedience, something demanded of no one else in the entire Bible. Ware’s analysis presumes that Abraham’s obedience on Mt. Moriah was a foregone conclusion because Abraham was categorically faithful. What Abraham proved here, though, was not categorical; it was a progressive faithfulness. Mere intention would not have been enough, otherwise none of us ever need act on our initial faith—God “knows our hearts”. Both testaments are adamant that God rewards us according to our works, not according to our intentions (Ps. 28:4, Jer. 25:14, Lam. 3:64, 1 Peter 1:17, Rev. 20:12). Such interpretations show that Ware is still using determinist presuppositions in analysing a non-determinist viewpoint.
Isaiah 40–48: “The end from the beginning” (p. 102–121)
Isaiah 40–48 has a number of passages in which God proclaims his foreknowledge, even in what appears to be rather general terms. In my opinion, this is just more of Ware misunderstanding open theism. Even in open theism, God has a general foreknowledge. Even in open theism, God has a plan and a direction for human history. Even in open theism, God’s foreknowledge of human history is an important evidence of his deity. Ware thinks that he has open theists completely trapped by noting that Isaiah predicted the naming of Cyrus. In reality, as I said in the beginning of this review, this is a non-moral decision, with no bearing on the eternal reward or punishment of those involved. God’s overarching providence is especially applied in Scripture in the case of kings and nations: “The king’s heart is a waterway in the hand of the LORD; He directs it where He pleases” (Prov. 21:1). God never claims in Scripture to foreknow whether someone will follow him, or whether they will receive hell or heaven at the end of their life.
Psalm 139:4 (p.123–125)
In the section on this psalm, Ware shows a disappointing lack of understanding of the Hebrew text of this psalm and the King James Version of it. First, he deals with verse 4: “For there is not a word in my tongue, but, lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether”. Ware only gives the NASB translation: “Even before there is a word on my tongue, / Behold, Lord, You know it all.” He assumes this is a hard case for exhaustive foreknowledge. In reality, the Hebrew has two possible readings through a syntactical ambiguity (Ellicott’s, Expositor’s Bible, Poole):
(a) “There is no word [present] on my tongue, [except that], lo, you know it altogether”
(b) “The word is not [yet] on my tongue, but, lo, you know it altogether”
So (a) would exhibit present knowledge, and (b) would exhibit foreknowledge. Poole and others considered the latter “more admirable”, apparently through its reinforcement of Calvinism. But there are many, even Calvinist interpreters, who do not understand this verse as having any reference to foreknowledge. Many commentators see this verse as asserting either God’s intimate knowledge of the meaning of our words (Barnes, Pulpit Commentary), or that God recognises our thoughts before they are formed into speech (Cambridge Bible, Expositor’s Bible, Geneva Study Bible). For what it’s worth, the latter has always been my understanding of the verse: God knows our thoughts and intentions before they are manifest in speech.
Psalm 139:16 “All my members” or “all my days”? (p.123–125)
Later, dealing with Psalm 139:16, Ware asks why the King James translators did not translate the word yamim (“days”) in Psalm 139:16 (p.125), implying that they completely left this word out. Confusingly, he then thinks that yamim was translated “members”—he seems entirely unsure how the English maps to the Hebrew here. In reality, the KJV translates yamim as an adverb, “in continuance”—an unusual solution. As for the word “members”, that was an attempt to supply the antecedent for the pronoun in “all of them” (kol-am), which is one of the chief difficulties of this passage. The pronoun simply lacks a clear antecedent. Commentators do not agree whether the phrase “all of them” (kol-am) refers forward to “days” (yamim) or backward to “imperfect substance” (golem). The King James translators took golem as having a kind of plural meaning, and translated kol-am “all of them” accordingly as “all my members“. Lange cites Clericus and Hitzig(?) as agreeing with this way of treating golem as the antecedent of the pronoun, but then rejects either golem or yamim as the antecedent. Text-critical scholars also think that something is fishy with the text here.
Translating yamim as “in continuance” (KJV) was not entirely without justification: similar words can act as a correlative conjunctions in other Semitic languages. Ware states, though, that commentators “uniformly” disagree with the King James here in not translating yamim as “days”. He is more or less justified in saying so, since he is only interested in contemporary works. In older commentaries, of course, I did find a few that are not so harsh on the King James: The Pulpit Commentary considers it the correct rendering. Ellicott considered it “possible, but not probable.”
Most intriguingly, John Calvin agrees with Gregory Boyd that Psalm 139:16 is about the miracle of pregnancy—not about meticulous foreordination of every detail of life.
Psalm 139 is a wonderful and intimate statement of divine omniscience, but it is not an unambiguous proof-text for exhaustive divine foreknowledge. This section was truly a weak point in Ware’s book, and he should have had it reviewed by someone who knew Hebrew.
Summation and Conclusion
In this review, I’ve still not handled the last part of the book, but I think it’s clear enough from what I’ve written that the biblical arguments of the book were undermined by his wholesale misrepresentation of open theism. His long-winded section on Bible prophecy had no teeth because he misunderstood how open theism works and why people believe it. His constant repetition that the open theist God “doesn’t know the future” was ostensibly a convenient shorthand, but, in my opinion, shows that his argument was not a “good faith” criticism of open theism. Such inflammatory language acts as a misdirect for uninformed readers, further polarises the discussion, and is unproductive. While Ware seeks to criticise open theism, he is mostly just criticising Greg Boyd and John Sanders—and there are many other open theists to choose from. If I recall correctly, Ware cited his own article on immutability about as much as he cited the entire wealth of biblical studies experts and Bible commentators. As someone who has heard from a variety of open theist teachers, many of Ware’s arguments simply didn’t apply.
Ware concludes that open theism has “adjusted its view of God to be culturally appealing at the expense of biblical fidelity” (p.175). If he knew the literature better, he would know that twentieth-century open theism was largely pioneered by biblical theologians such as Terence Fretheim and Walter Brueggemann, and was motivated by faithfulness to the tone and tenor of the text, especially of the Hebrew Bible, over against forced interpretations motivated by external considerations from systematic theology.